Is public sector borrowing too high? by Bain, A. D.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Bain, A. D. (1980) Is public sector borrowing too high? Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, 5 (3). pp. 30-39. ISSN 0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/50599/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
IS PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING TOO HIGH? 
In recent years the high level of government borrowing has been at the centre of 
economic and political debate. On the one hand the public sector borrowing 
requirement (.PSBR) is blamed for record mortgage rates and the threat that industry 
may be starved of the funds it needs. On the other, proposals which are likely to 
cut the PSBR are denounced as deflationary and damaging to living standards. Some 
claim that a high PSBR is a cause of inflation, whilst others argue that if proper 
account is taken of inflation the PSBR is much less formidable than it seems. This 
article attempts to set out some facts about the sources and extent of public 
sector borrowing and to consider briefly some of the issues involved. 
Trends in the PSBR 
There is no doubt that the apparent growth of the PSBR has been magnified by 
inflation. When prices double in less than 5 years comparisons in money terms 
can be grossly misleading. Thus, for example, although at over £8,000 million in 
1978 the PSBR was twice its 1973 value in money terms, after allowance is made for 
inflation the real value was actually slightly less. Moreover, public sector 
activities have to be viewed in relation to the economy as a whole. A useful 
measure, which eliminates distortions due to inflation, is therefore the ratio of 
the PSBR to GDP, and this is shown in Figure 1 for the period since 1966. 
During the 1960's the PSBR averaged some 2J% of GDP. It rose to over 4J% in 1967, 
but the measures to restrain demand which followed devaluation at the end of 1967 
cut it back sharply; by 1969 the public sector was actually repaying debt, amounting 
to as much as 1% of GDP, and in 1970 it remained virtually in balance. In the next 
5 years borrowing rose very sharply to a peak of 10% of GDP in 1975, since when it 
has been reduced to around 5% of GDP, still well above the average of the sixties. 
(The rise in 1979 has been associated with temporary factors, such as delayed 
payments of telephone bills and the timing of VAT payments.) 
In considering its borrowing the public sector is often treated as a whole because 
much of the necessary finance is raised by the government centrally and because 
policy decisions are often taken by reference to the activities of the whole public 
sector. But the PSBR has its origins in the separate activities of the central 
government, local authorities and public corporations, each of which have their own 
sources of revenue and their own spending programmes. In broad terms borrowing by 
a sector is necessary if its current revenue falls short of its current spending or, 
more commonly, because the excess of current revenue over current expenditure (a 
sector's saving) is insufficient to finance the sector's capital investment 
programme. The excess of capital spending over saving is known as the sector's 
financial deficit. Apart from borrowing to finance its own financial deficit,a 
sector also has to borrow if it adds to its financial asset holdings, for example 
by purchasing securities or making loans to other sectors. Figures 2 - 4 , show 
the saving, investment and financial deficits of.the public corporations, local 
authorities and central government respectively. 
Saving has been measured as the excess of current revenue over current costs, 
calculated after deducting stock appreciation and depreciation on a replacement 
cost basis. Capital grants made or received by the sector have also been 
included in saving. Investment includes structures, equipment, and the 
physical increase in stocks, but is net of depreciation ie it excludes the 
investment needed to maintain the existing capital stock. 
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Figure 2 shows that the public corporations as a whole have run at a loss in every 
year since 1966 - the profits earned by the more successful corporations such as 
British Gas have not been enough to offset the deficits of the less profitable such 
as British Steel. There was a tendency for this loss (dis-saving) to increase in 
the first half of the 1970's, but since then it has been between \% and 1% of GDP, 
At over 2% of GDP, net investment by public corporations reached a peak in 1967, 
but after that curbs on capital programmes caused a fall to only about i% of GDP by 
1972 and 1973. Expansion in the next two years was followed by further curbs, so 
that the net investment has now practically ceased. The peak financial deficit -
almost 3% of GDP -i occurred in 1975; since then it has been cut to about 1%, very 
largely as a result of the fall in investment. 
Local authorities have generally managed to have a surplus on their current oper-
ations (Figure 3). Their saving has been positive in every year except 1974, when 
the rapid rise in wage and salary costs caught them unprepared; by contrast, over-
provision in the level of rates for possible wage and salary increases in 1976 led 
to a greater than usual surplus. By and large the fluctuations in saving by local 
authorities have been slight and for the most part unintentional. Net investment 
at the end of the 1960's amounted to about 3% of the GDP, and while it was affected 
by the restraints on public spending at the end of the decade it rose again to a 
peak of„over 3% in 1974. Since then there has been a steady decline to about 1% 
of GDP. At the end of the 1960's the local authorities were running a financial 
deficit of about 2J% of GDP. After falling to under 2% in 1971 this rose to 
nearly 3J% in 1974, when the investment peak coincided with the current account 
deficit, before falling back to under 1% now. 
Figure 4 demonstrates clearly that the major cause of the increase in the PSBR has 
been the decline in saving by the central government. Throughout the 1960's the 
central government had a financial surplus - its tax revenue exceeded its current 
spending, including grants to other sectors. The government therefore made a 
significant contribution to saving each year, rising to a peak of over 6% of GDP 
in 1970. Thereafter tax cuts and rising government expenditure caused a precipi-
tous fall; by 1976 the surplus had vanished and the central government was dis-
saving to the extent of over 2J% of GDP. While the balance between revenue and 
current spending improved in 1977, dis-saving has since increased again to about 
2i% of GDP. Central government investment has varied comparatively little as a 
proportion of GDP, though it has been falling recently. 
The three components of the public sector are brought together in Figure 5, which 
shows saving, investment and the financial surplus or deficit of the public sector 
as a whole. Saving rose to a peak of 6% of GDP in 1970, but has since been reduced 
by about 10% of GDP until now dis-saving amounts to some 4%. Investment has fallen 
from about 5% of GDP at the end of the 1960's, to about li% of GDP. The over-
all financial deficit, which averaged under 2J% of GDP in the 1960's and moved into 
surplus in 1969 and 1970, reached a peak of 7i% of GDP in 1975 and still amounts to 
about 5% of GDP. 
When public sector organisations make loans or purchase securities they have to 
raise the necessary finance themselves, and this adds to the PSBR. Examples are 
loans by local authorities for house purchase, government loans as part of the 
overseas aid programme, loans for export credit, loans to industry and the purchase 
of equity shares to assist companies in difficulties or to help them to expand. 
The public sector is also affected by the timing of tax and other payments. 
After removing inflationary gains in stock and allowing for depreciation on a 
replacement cost basis. 
The decline has been exaggerated slightly by the fact that local authorities 
now lease some capital equipment which they would previously have bought. 
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The total funds required for net lending are shown in Figure 6„ There have been 
substantial erratic year-to-year movements, but there was a strong upward trend in 
the first half of the 1970's, due largely to house purchase loans and export credit, 
Finance from the public sector for these purposes has now been reduced, and with 
the help of sales of assets the government has sought to keep this element of the 
PSBR at a low level. The sharp rise in 1979 is due partly to erratic factors. 
Reasons for public sector borrowing 
The primary purpose of public sector borrowing is to finance expenditure, but there 
are questions over the kinds of expenditure which justify borrowing and the extent 
of borrowing which is appropriate. In the private sector it is generally accepted 
that an enterprise should earn sufficient income to meet all its current expenses, 
including replacement cost depreciation, and make some contribution towards the 
cost of investment for expansion. It is difficult to see why a similar practice 
should not apply within the public sector: if, for social reasons, subsidies for 
particular activities are thought desirable, grants financed from taxation should 
be made to the enterprise concerned, and such grants should be treated as part of 
that enterprise's income. As noted above the public corporations, taken as a 
whole, have consistently failed to meet this objective, since their earnings 
(including subsidies) have been insufficient to meet their current expenses. Local 
authorities' revenue from rates, rents and government grants have generally covered 
all their current spending, and left something over as a contribution toward invest-
ment. Throughout the 1960's the central government raised through taxes more than 
it required for its own current expenditure, including grants to other sectors of 
the economy, and this saving rose to a peak in the early 1970's, but since 1975 
current spending and grants have exceeded revenue. 
Until 1973 saving by the central government was sufficient not only to finance the 
whole of its own investment but also to make some contribution towards the finan-
cing of the public corporations and local authorities: in round numbers about half 
of the net investment - usually amounting to between 5% and 6% of GDP - was 
financed by borrowing. Recent experience provides a striking contrast. Public 
sector investment has been much lower, averaging only about 24% of GDP in the last 
4 years; the public sector has had to borrow to finance the whole of this capital 
expenditure; and as much again has been borrowed to finance current expenditure. 
A clear distinction can be drawn between borrowing for investment and borrowing for 
consumption. The former increases the potential output of the economy; new power 
stations increase the supply of electric power, and better houses or improved 
medical facilities raise the standard of living. It is legitimate to expect 
people to pay for these services at the time they enjoy them, Borrowing for 
investment can be regarded as self-financing, with interest and capital to be 
repaid from the revenue earned or through the effect of the investment in enlarging 
the tax base. Current consumption, on the other hand, does nothing to increase 
output or raise the standard of living in future. However, if it is financed by 
borrowing, whether by issuing securities or money, today's public are provided with 
claims on future output. People today hope to have their cake and eat it: for 
they are able to consume more now, by failing to pay through the tax system for the 
services currently provided, and they expect to be able to consume in future when 
they sell the securities they have purchased or spend their money. There is a 
real sense in which public sector borrowing for consumption imposes a burden on 
future generations. 
Persistent public sector borrowing for consumption is therefore difficult to defend. 
But a good case can be made for public sector borrowing to rise during recessions 
and fall during booms. For more than 30 years UK governments have recognised that 
their tax and expenditure policies affect the level of employment, and the main-
tenance of a high level of economic activity has been a prominent objective, Thus 
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when recessions were anticipated, governments generally sought to raise the level 
of public sector spending and reduce taxation; whereas they reacted to boom 
conditions by raising taxes and cutting expenditure. The effects can be seen 
clearly in the graphs of saving and investment: for example, in Figure 4, saving 
by the central government increased sharply from 1968 to 1970 as a result of the 
government's attempts to stabilise the economy after the devaluation in 1967, and 
the subsequent decline in saving was prompted by the Heath government's attempt to 
revive economic activity, and by the Wilson government's response to the world-wide 
recession brought on by the OPEC price rise at the end of 1973. Similar forces 
influenced investment by public corporations (Figure 2) and local authorities 
(Figure 3) until about 1975, It is noticeable, however, that the fluctuations in 
investment have been very much smaller than those in central government saving. 
In principle deliberate fluctuations in investment and saving of this kind have much 
to commend them, provided that they are seen as part of a conscious counter-cyclical 
policy, with comparatively low investment in one year being matched by comparatively 
high in another, so that over the cycle as a whole the level of investment is not 
curtailed* Indeed, the hope is that by maintaining a more stable level of activity 
in the economy at large, investment and the rate of growth may both be stimulated. 
Similarly, if saving is to be low or negative in a recession, it must attain a high 
positive level in a boom - otherwise the resources which society hands over to 
future generations will be reduced. In practice it is always much easier politi-
cally to cut taxes than to raise them; there is a danger that restrictive policies 
will lean relatively heavily on investment, whilst expansion will be biassed towards 
consumption. The downward trends in public sector investment and saving since the 
mid-1960's suggest that this has in fact occurred. 
The average level of public sector saving which is desirable - the contribution the 
public sector should make to financing its own investment and to facilitating 
investment in the private sector - is a matter for political judgement. It turns 
on the level of investment in the economy as a whole which is thought to be 
appropriate, and the contribution which private sector saving can make to it. For 
many years the level of investment in Britain has been lower than in most of our 
main industrial competitors, and there has been a consensus that through its 
economic policies the government should attempt to stimulate a higher level. Until 
the early 1970's the saving originating in the private sector was also insufficient 
to provide the finance for investment, and the government therefore supplemented 
voluntary private saving with compulsory saving through the tax system. 
Against a background of inflation and world recession the opportunities for 
industrial investment are currently depressed; and personal saving is running at a 
high level. Thus, in cyclical terms, it can be argued that an above-average PSBR 
is warranted. But there is no case for placing curbs on public sector investment. 
On the contrary, depressed private investment provides an opportunity for public 
sector investment to increase. If, for reasons discussed below, it is necessary 
to reduce the PSBR, the cuts should fall on consumption - public or private -
rather than investment. It is therefore difficult to believe that the balance at 
present between saving and investment in the public sector is right. 
The effects of a high PSBR 
It is often alleged that the high level of the PSBR has led to high interest rates, 
and that the cost of capital to other borrowers acts as a deterrent to desirable 
capital expenditure. It is asserted too that the size of the PSBR interferes 
with smooth control of the money supply, with further damaging effects. 
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Leaving cyclical considerations on one side there is no doubt that the public and 
private sector's demands for funds in the capital market are competitive: high 
public sector borrowing takes place at the expense of the private sector. And, 
since by and large the capital market operates freely, it is the price of funds 
rather than rationing which restrains the private sector's demands. For example, 
industrial companies are unwilling to issue new long-term loans or make rights 
issues when interest rates and dividend yields are high; and when mortgage rates 
rise the amount that private individuals can afford to borrow falls. 
There are, however, three qualifications that need to be made. First, the PSBR 
is certainly not the principal cause of high interest rates in Britain today -
that dubious honour rests with inflation. Secondly, during a recession a cut in 
the PSBR might lead initially to a fall in economic activity and a reduction in 
the flow of saving into the capital market. Nevertheless, interest rates would 
tend to fall and after some time had elapsed - how long is a matter for heated 
controversy - private expenditure would pick up to fill the gap. In current 
conditions, when banks are short of funds to lend to private borrowers and MLR has 
had to be raised to 17% to discourage private demand, the delay would probably be 
very short indeed. Thirdly, part of the PSBR, as noted earlier, is due to loans 
supplied by the government to the private sector and, to the extent that private 
borrowers would have obtained the funds elsewhere, is not a net addition to the 
demand for funds. In spite of these qualifications a high PSBR which is main-
tained for several years, as it has been in this country, generally raises the 
cost of capital for other borrowers. 
The conflict between public and private borrowing is particularly visible in the 
context of monetary policy. From time to time the government's needs as a 
borrower have conflicted with their desire to implement a tight monetary policy. 
When the private demand for credit is strong, government borrowing from the banking 
system may be inconsistent with monetary control. 
Although in practice the government now raises a great deal of money through national 
savings and other means, sales of gilt-edged stocks still provide a very substantial 
part of their requirements. Heavy and continuous government borrowing therefore 
entails regular sales of gilts. It is not always easy for the government to find 
buyers for its stock: for if economic prospects, particularly the outlook for 
inflation, are uncertain or if political developments cast a shadow over the 
financial markets, potential buyers may be reluctant to commit their funds, prefer-
ring instead to build up liquidity until the clouds have cleared. But a build-up 
of liquidity runs counter to monetary policy, since it will be reflected in an 
acceleration of monetary growth. The government, who cannot therefore afford to 
wait, has to overcome buyers' resistance, normally by jacking up interest rates to 
a level which makes gilts seem attractive. Moreover, in a period when the future 
rate of inflation is highly uncertain, gilt-edged stocks - even with high interest 
rates - are not a particularly attractive way of holding savings. Pension funds, 
for example, which are now the most important channel through which long-term 
savings flow, seek assets which are likely to retain their purchasing power so that 
they can provide adequate pensions for the members of their schemes, and over a 
long period property or ordinary shares are more likely than gilt-edged stocks to 
enable them to achieve this objective. Personal savers, too, generally hold 
deposits rather than long-term securities, or commit their savings to bricks and 
mortar which are likely to retain their value. The upshot is that the combination 
of a high PSBR with a tight monetary policy leads to high interest rates, both to 
curb the private sector's demand for credit and to tempt savers to hold the liabil-
ities of the public sector. 
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Inflation and the PSBR 
In many countries the government's failure to raise enough tax revenue to finance 
its expenditure is a potent source of inflationary pressure. This is especially 
likely to occur if spending is financed by printing money. It is frequently 
suggested, by analogy, that the high PSBR in Britain is a cause of inflation here. 
If a high PSBR led to pressure on resources, so that wages and prices were bid up, 
there would undoubtedly be a direct inflationary effect. However, it is difficult 
to argue that this is the case in current conditions, and provided that monetary 
policy does not accommodate a high PSBR, there is no reason why it should occur at 
any time. Instead, as has been suggested earlier, the high PSBR will raise 
interest rates and deter private demand, so that demand in aggregate is not 
excessive. There may nevertheless be an indirect effect on inflation: for if the 
high PSBR is at the expense of investment the future productive capacity of the 
economy will be affected adversely. With less potential growth it will become 
more difficult to meet workers* aspirations for increased real incomes, and higher 
wages will be reflected more fully in rising prices rather than increased product-
vitity. 
On the other tack, it is often argued that the size of the PSBR has been exaggerated 
by inflation. In periods of inflation lenders have to be compensated for the 
declining purchasing power of their capital. The government is therefore compelled 
to pay more for its funds, but part of the interest payment may properly be regarded 
as merely maintaining the real value of its borrowing. Indeed, unless sufficient 
new borrowing takes place, inflation erodes the real value of the national debt. 
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The very fact that interest costs have risen by such a small amount demonstrates 
that the high PSBR is not a consequence of inflation. Nor would it conveniently 
melt away if the rate of inflation diminished; the cost of interest payments would 
fall, but since much of the debt is long-term the process would be long drawn-out. 
An abatement of inflation would in fact give rise to considerable financing 
problems for the government, because inflation compels people to save more in order 
to maintain the purchasing power of their assets, and this element in saving would 
decrease if prices rose more slowly. Thus the PSBR would absorb a higher propor-
tion of the available saving, and this would reduce the funds available for other 
borrowers. Moreover, even if the purchasing power of assets is falling the saving 
required to make good the depredation of inflation is real enough - it represents 
consumption forgone by the saver and purchasing power transferred to the borrower, 
Through inflation the government as a borrower imposes unanticipated or unavoidable 
losses on lenders. For the government to rely on mulcting the public in this way 
would be deplorable. 
Conclusion 
The trends in the PSBR in the 1970's were deeply disturbing. It is not so much 
the fact that the PSBR has increased that gives cause for concern. If the PSBR 
were to increase because the government was acting as a channel through which 
private saving could flow into investment, a high PSBR might be positively advan-
tageous. But the rise in the PSBR has had no such beneficial cause; it has been 
associated with a massive decline in public sector saving and a reduction in 
public sector investment. Throughout the 1960's governments followed fiscal 
policies which enabled them to augment the savings of the private sector and provide 
additional resources for investment; whereas by the end of the 1970's the government 
was siphoning off part of private saving for conversion into current consumption. 
On a medium-term view there is a need for a substantial increase in the level of 
of investment, in both the public and private sectors, in Britain. Recovery in 
the private sector may have to await an improvement in the general economic situa-
tion, though a fall in the cost of capital for industry would help. But the scale 
of public sector investment is in the government's hands, and while the rewards for 
further investment in some activities may be questionable, there is ample scope for 
larger investment programmes in some areas, eg the energy industries, transport, 
and other aspects of social infrastructure. 
Higher investment by the public sector alone points to the need for a change in the 
balance between consumption and investment in public sector spending, or to an 
increase in tax revenue to pay for what is currently consumed. But a recovery in 
private sector investment will compel the government to go even further - to cut 
borrowing for its own purposes, not merely to change the balance within the PSBR, 
A reduction in the PSBR will be even more necessary if, as is probable, private 
sector saving falls when inflation is brought under control. 
A change of course in public policy has already taken place. The current account 
subsidies paid to some of the public corporations are being controlled, and after 
taking them into account public corporations are being required to operate at a 
profit and make some contribution to financing their own investment. The balance 
between taxation and expenditure of the central government is being altered; and 
revenue from North Sea oil and gas will help. But if investment in the public 
sector and the PSBR are to return to the levels of the 1960s, public sector saving 
needs to rise by more than 5% of GDP - about £10,000 million at current prices. 
This is a daunting task, and one whose magnitude is not yet generally appreciated. 
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